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writings and medieval Jewish philosophy, for Jews were important and 
influential cohabitants--not to mention writers and historians--in medieval 
Spain. 
Recent work on the kharjas (short, fragmentary verses in Mozarabic, the 
archaic dialect of Spanish spoken in Muslim-ruled Spain) has opened up new 
avenues for integrating Spain's three cultures into feminist analyses, as has the 
discussion of Moorish and Jewish women in some of Spain's oldest known 
texts (e.g., Samuel G. Armistead's and James T. Monroe's "A New Version 
of La morica de Antequera." La Coronica 12.2 [1984]: 228-40, and Edna 
Aizenberg's "Unajudfa muy fermosa: The Jewess as Sex Object in Medieval 
Spanish Literature and Lore." La Coronica 12.2 [1984]: 187-94). Yet much 
more could be done in this area. 
Finally, it is urgent that those who work in the field participate more 
actively in broader feminist academic organizations and publications. I was 
stunned to discover at the 1988 Kalamazoo meeting that there were only two 
representatives of medieval Spanish studies in attendance at the Medieva l 
Feminist Newsletter business meeting. Colleagues in feminist studies covering 
different regions and different disciplines have much to learn from one 
another, as I myself have seen in my most recent project, a collection of 
essays on widows in medieval European literatures and histories. The 
resources uncovered by all medieval feminist investigators can profitably be 
shared by those who work on women in medieval Spain. And, from the 
perspective of those unfamiliar with medieval Spanish history and literature, 
the growing interest in multicultural feminist studies should make this field a 
natural one to study. 
Louise Mirrer, Fordham University 
Commentary 
In the last "Commentary" column (MFN 6, fall 1988) eight readers 
offered reactions to an article entitled "Medieval Misogyny" (Representations 
20) written by R. Howard Bloch, Univ. of California, Berkeley. The eight 
respondents were Elizabeth A. Clark, Duke University; Wendy Clein, 
University of Connecticut; Elaine Hansen, Haverford College; Peggy Knapp, 
Carnegie Mellon University; Marshall Leicester, Cowell College, Univ. of 
California, Santa Cruz; Linda Lomperis, Cowell College, Univ. of California, 
Santa Cruz; Carol Neel, The Colorado College; and Helen Solterer, Duke 
University. 
Prof. Bloch was invited to respond. His comments follow: 
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Let me thank the contributors to the "Medieval Feminist Newsletter" for 
their comment on my article "Medieval Misogyny." Since the eight responses 
resemble each other so closely (and, therefore, even if untrue, must 
nonetheless be significant), I hope that the contributors will forgive my 
treating their contribution as a whole rather than independently. Here, then, is 
the reproach: 
1) I do not pay sufficient attention to historical context, what Elizabeth 
Clark refers to as "the varieties of woman-hating. " 
I must admit that I fail to find much variety among medieval 
misogynists who, once they choose to play this tune, seem to perform on a 
violin with only one string. "Judging from the treatises of all philosophers and 
poets and from all the orators ( ... )," writes Christine de Pizan, "it seems that 
they [misogynists] all speak from one and the same mouth" (Cite des Dames, 
tr. E. Jeffrey Richards [New York, 1982], p. 4). I know, having read 
Elizabeth Clark's Jerome, Chrysostom, and Friends, that Jerome was a fine 
human being and a friend to many women. But this is another topic, and I am 
not quite sure how to relate it to the role he played in founding perhaps more 
influentially than any other Church Father (though not quite so virulently as 
Chrysostom in places) the discourse of misogyny that was appropriated by 
later medieval writers much more readily than any other aspect of his wise 
pastoral care and that was passed to the Middle Ages in collections or 
florilegia, which may help to explain its seeming uniformity. Even Jerome's 
counsel to women--e.g., for virgins to remain virgins, for widows not to 
remarry--might be seen as somewhat paternalistic, though expressive no doubt 
of a wider split within the Christian religion (after Paul), which, on the one 
hand, professes to make men and women equal and, on the other hand, makes 
woman the "Devil's gateway." Nor is it enough simply to ascribe the 
misogyny of Jerome and others to Christianity's ascetic campaign against the 
temptations of the flesh. The fact is that at this historical moment (some say as 
early as Paul, others as late as Augustine), the horror of the flesh became 
resolutely gendered as feminine (and estheticized) in a way that had not quite 
been in Stoic, Gnostic, Manichaean, Judaic, Platonic, Aristotelian, or Late 
Roman tradition. 
To say that misogyny has no internal history is not to say that it does 
not have a history or that it is "only a text" or that its effects, like Freud's 
theory of seduction, are not real. It is to say that any essentialist definition of 
woman, whether negative or positive, whether made by a man or a woman, is 
the most basic definition of misogyny there is. Any speech act that says 
"Woman is," and has as a predicate a more general term falls within the pale of 
what I define as antifeminism, and is a dangerous gesture precisely because it 
eliminates the subject from history. (See Sheila Ryan Johansson's "'Herstory' 
as History" in Liberating Women's History: Theoretical and Critical Essays 
[Urbana, 1976] for a fuller account of why this is so.) One must, therefore, be 
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careful to distinguish between such a speech act, made by the self-identified 
misogynists I quote in my article, and my definition of what they are doing. I 
am careful not to use the phrase "Woman is ... " without its being bracketed by 
something like, "according to the discourse of medieval misogyny, ... " For it 
is only by making such a distinction that one can begin to identify not only the 
obvious fonns of misogyny, but the more subtle, invisible manifestations of 
its grand themes, some of which even look like the opposite of woman-hating 
(more later). 
If anyone doubts the monotonous persistence into the current era of the 
topoi of misogyny first established in the early centuries of Christianity, let 
her read Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, C. Lombroso, Proudhon, Baudelaire, 
Huysmans, Barby d'Aurevilly, and, yes, even that sorcerer's apprentice 
Michelet, on the subject of woman; there she will find almost verbatim 
repetition of Tertullian's notions concerning the feminine and decoration or of 
the cliche of woman as verbal abuse. Again, the post-Christian discourse of 
misogyny has no internal history because it is defined by a definition of 
woman as ahistorical; which is not the same as saying it has not been different 
in other non-Christian cultures, or that it has not been used in different ways 
in the course of the Christian era, even though here one can point to a rather 
singular purpose, which is sUbjugation. 
Finally, the essay published in Representations is only the first part of a 
much larger project entitled Medieval Misogyny and the Invention o/Western 
Romantic Love, which sets as its goal to situate the discourse of misogyny 
within the social context of early Christianity. Further, I seek to situate within 
an even more precise historical context the rise of what has sometimes been 
seen as the antidote to, the liberation from, misogyny--the language of courtly 
love, which can be both geographically and temporally localized in Provence 
between 1075 and 1125, and from which our own notions of romantic love 
ultimately derive. I think it can be shown that courtliness came about as the 
result of a change in women's possessory rights in the region of Southern 
France at this time and that it is not the opposite of misogyny, but misogyny's 
inverted image. To put the thesis crudely: as long as woman was merely a 
possession to be disposed of between men, she was vilified in the tenns of 
misogyny; as soon as she became capable of disposing in her own right, she 
was idealized in the tenns of courtly love. Misogyny and courtliness are co-
conspiring abstractions of the feminine. To repeat, unless one is willing to 
accept a definition of antifeminism according to which the woman is seen as 
timeless, outside of history, abstracted, one is liable to miss the fact that the 
idealization of woman is only another version of, just as disempowering as, 
her denigration. What I am saying is nothing new according to many of my 
women friends who tell me they experience woman-worship as being just as 
alienating as woman-hating. 
2) I do not offer portraits of good, powerful women alongside that of 
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the misogynistic portrayal of woman. 
My essay is not about women in the Middle Ages; it is not intended as a 
rounded portrait either of women, or of the images of woman, or of the social 
roles of women. That has been done by others far better than I. It is about one 
particular slanted version of woman, which happens also to be particularly 
influential upon the question of gender until this very day. I certainly am not 
suggesting that there were not, alongside the discourse of misogyny, a myriad 
of galleries of good women stretching from Augustine's portrayal of the 
martyrs Felicity and Perpetua, or Gregory of Nyssa's portrait of his sister, to 
Christine de Pizan's Cite des Dames or Chaucer's Legend of Good Women; 
nor do I wish in the least to suggest that the question of female forms of piety 
and spirituality were not an important element of medieval culture. One could 
even point to the cult of the Virgin and to the rise of twelfth-century Mariology 
as a counter-discourse to that of misogyny, though, here again, I am not so 
sure there is all that much difference between the reifying worship of the 
Virgin Mary and earlier exhortations, at the heart of the discourse of 
misogyny, to virginity. 
3) I do not engage with feminists, or do not cite feminists; I seem to be 
speaking to men instead of women. 
I could not agree more with the examples offered of good feminists 
whose work is to be taken into account. No work illustrates better than Naomi 
Schor's Reading in Detail the manifestation of medieval misogynistic topoi in 
the nineteenth century--that is, the persistent alliance of the feminine with the 
decorative, the esthetic, the superficial. No work better than that of Carolyn 
Bynum shows the rich cultural reservoirs of feminine imagery on which the 
misogynistic writers of the High Middle Ages could have drawn had they not 
been so obsessed by statically fixed negative portrayals invented, in some 
cases, almost twelve centuries earlier. Penny Schine Gold's The Lady and the 
Virgin is a work which I not only admire but on which I rely in the final 
chapter of my book for the analysis of the historical condition of women in the 
region of Fontevrault (see my review of The Lady and the Virgin in Modern 
Philology, November 1986). Finally, if there is any book that seems to 
confirm for a later period my thesis that the discourse of misogyny is a 
discourse by men, for men, of men, it is Eve Sedgwick's Between Men. My 
depiction of misogyny as a language constituted by celibate men for each other 
is, finally, a perfect example of what Luce lrigaray means when she says that 
"the enigma that is woman will therefore constitute the target, the object, the 
stake, of a masculine discourse, of a debate among men, which would not 
consult her, would not concern her. Which, ultimately, she is not supposed to 
know anything about" (Speculum of the Other Woman, tr. G. Gill, p. 13). 
Please note that my quotation of Irigaray does not represent an endorsement 
by either her or me of the way she perceives the feminine to have been 
constituted by male culture throughout the ages. 
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4) All the contributors pose one or another version of the question 
"Where do I situate myself' with respect to this topic, and Linda Lomperis 
asks the obvious "Where is my subject?" (as if the discovery of my subject 
would expose the brute antifeminist at work). 
Though we are, of course, always somewhat blind to our own desires 
and motives, I can only reply that I am a self-identified gendered male, who is 
profeminist. I am, however, prevented out of a deep respect for some 
feminisms (for there are many, and they are by no means all the same [see 
Janet Todd's recent Feminist Literary History]) from adopting the voice of a 
woman, "to speak like a woman," in the current phrase. For, as both men and 
women are becoming increasingly aware, the ventriloquistic imitation of the 
voice of the other can turn out, in this hyperflorescent moment of the pre-
humiliated sublime, to be either a strategy of seduction or a usurpation of the 
power of the other to speak for herself. Moreover, the quick move from 
"speaking like a woman" to an essentialized notion of woman as truth--yet 
another version of the Eternal Woman--places such a gesture firmly within one 
of the strong currents of Western misogyny from Plato to at least Nietzsche. 
Thus I have no choice that would not be as politically disenfranchising to 
women as the urge to "speak like a woman" finally is. Nor is this perspective 
necessarily such a bad one from which to approach a subject that is often too 
painful for many women to face head on, since, as a male, I am keenly aware 
not so much perhaps of what it feels like to be the victim of misogyny as of 
the many ruses of speech that even the most ardently feminist, sexually correct 
men use in order to continue to act as men have always acted. (In New French 
Feminisms [eds. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron], Gisele Halimi, 
discussing what she calls "Doormat-Pedestal tactics," quotes Sacha Guitry, 
who "is willing to admit that women are superior to men as long as they do 
not seek to be equal. ") This is why I think it is so important to distinguish 
between language and action, words and deeds, where relations between the 
genders are concerned. Such a move is, in fact, the foundation of a political 
reading, which otherwise would remain hopelessly enmeshed in the literalism 
of false ideology. 
For more information about me as subject see my recently published 
first novel Moses in the Promised Land (Smith Peregrine Books, 1988, 
$10.95), Chapter V, "The Professor." 
5) I am faulted by Marshall Leicester for taking a pleasure in writing 
that borders on the pornographic. 
I enjoy writing. Anyone who reads my articles and books will, I think, 
agree. And what is the alternative? To drone on in a sad, disabused tone of 
voice whose roots in the most virulent Puritanism to be found in America hit, 
right here in California, a bedrock of asceticism that resembles nothing so 
much as the Early Church Fathers's horror of the flesh. The more sad we 
become the more we assent to that which we think we are resisting. 
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In conclusion, I would like to say a word about what I sense in the 
response to my article to be a certain disapproval of the topic. The assumption 
here has to be that writing about misogyny automatically constitutes an 
endorsement of it, as if the sociologist's study of poverty were an apology for 
abjection , or the medical researcher's study of cancer were a welcome to 
disease. It is true that I do validate the topic, because I think that it is one that 
is often taken for granted but rarely recognized; that, when recognized, is 
often analyzed only superficially (even in the psychoanalytic and 
anthropological instances, which tend to naturalize); and, finally , that it is a 
pervasive mode of thought which, because it is often occulted, continues to 
function insidiously--that cannot, in other words, simply be washed away. 
"Misogyny," as Frances Ferguson and I write in the Introduction to the 
Representations volume that will appear this spring as a book (Univ. of 
California Press), "seemed to us to emblematize the problem that 
representation poses when it creates oppositions between what we perceive 
and what we endorse. And in that sense, it provides the occasion for a 
discussion of the limits of idealism, or of a conflict between authors and 
readers comparable to the conflict between misogynists and the women who 
are misrepresented by its pervasive and perfidious, but often unrecognized , 
images. Some recent feminist writing has imagined that this disjunction could 
be healed by a science fiction , a utopian vision that would realign our desires 
with our views about the world; but, while accepting the spirit of that vision, 
the essays in this volume largely concern themselves with the difficulties of 
enacting an easy fit between representation and what one might think of as 
political will." 
My own strategy, in exploring the pitfalls and paradoxes of the 
medieval discourse of misogyny, is not simply to recite once again the history 
of a tort, a litany of woe, but to push this insidious discourse to its limit, to 
expose as clearly as possible its internal incoherences, to deconstruct, in short, 
that which will not go away simply by wishing that it weren't so. "Medieval 
Misogyny" is to my knowledge the first attempt to say to Tertullian, Jerome, 
Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, Novatian, Methodius, 
Clement of Rome and Clement of Alexandria, as well as their intellectual and 
literary heirs, that where a certain vision of woman is concerned, "you are not 
only wrong, but you contradict yourself." Such a strategy, which recognizes 
that moral righteousness and counter examples--both medieval and modem--
have historically never been enough, or very effective, can only through some 
unexamined desire on the part of another subject than my own be construed as 
complicit with that which it seeks to undo. 
R. Howard Bloch, University of California, Berkeley 
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